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In this session, we asked two distinguished economists with extensive policy experience a 
very big question: how far were shortcomings of the policy frameworks of the major central 
banks responsible for the financial crisis? The many schools of thought on this question can, 
for convenience, be grouped under three headings: microeconomic; macroeconomic; and 
macroprudential. These big words convey a reassuring sense of neat categories; but in 
practice the linkages between them are many and complex.  
Microeconomic 
The first school of thought emphasizes microeconomic failures: those responsible for 
banking supervision (not always central banks) were too laissez-faire in their attitude to 
financial innovation. This argument is well known. Banks made the securitisation of debts 
ever more complex so that their very opacity would induce buyers to overpay for the resultant 
products. This proved for a time very profitable. In other words, they deliberately exploited 
the information asymmetries that lie at the heart of the banking business. There was also a 
classic agency problem: traders took risky positions which earned them handsome bonuses 
but left banks holding large losses. Finally, there was moral hazard because banks were too 
big to fail.  
None of these market failures – information asymmetry, agency problem and moral hazard – 
is new. Economists have been using these concepts in the study of the banking industry for 
years. Market failures mean that normal competitive forces cannot be counted on to produce 
a level of system-wide leverage consistent with stability. The first best policy response to this 
is more effective regulatory oversight. Only if this is not feasible could any second best 
argument be made for using monetary policy. Michael Dooley argues that better oversight 
should not be more intrusive regulation but rather more effective supervision. And 
effectiveness requires not only competent supervisors but also the political support for a 
strong enforcement process. 
Macroeconomic  
The second school of thought is that central banks became too focused on their primary 
objective of price stability – and neglected financial stability. There are at least four versions 
of this thesis. 
One version is that the very expansionary monetary policies of the Federal Reserve after 
2001 fuelled an extraordinary appetite for risk in global financial markets. This led to the 
marked compression of market volatility, lower risk premia, asset price bubbles and so on 
that sowed the seeds of the current crisis. The obvious problem with this thesis is that there 
was no evidence in the recent cycle of any simple link between the policy rate and the usual 
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measures of volatility or risk appetite in financial markets.
3 Virtually all measures show that risk 
premia and volatility measures continued to fall after the Federal Reserve had concluded its 
tightening phase in June 2006, with the federal funds rate at 5¼%. Graph 2 shows that the 
simple aggregate measure of market volatility and risk spreads (green line) bears no relationship 
with the US policy rate (dark gray shading). (In some earlier cycles, by contrast, monetary 
tightening led to a decline in GDP – and of course recessions do lead to higher risk premia.) 
Another problem with this explanation is that it is implausible to attribute a period of low real 
long-term rates that lasted several years to monetary policy. In any event, the US 
government bond yield did not rise as policy rates were increased from mid-2004 (red line). 
There was somewhat closer correlation in the 1999 to 2000 tightening episode – although 
movements in bond yields led, rather than lagged, the policy rate. The question of what 
determines the benchmark long rate is an important and unresolved question that is central 
to any explanation of movements in asset prices. 
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The shaded area represents the target federal funds rate The vertical dotted lines mark 23 September 1998 (the
date of the bailout of Long Term Capital Management); 11 September 2001; 2  December 2001 (the Enron 
bankruptcy); and 15 September 2008 (the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy). 
1  In per cent.    
2  Simple average of standardized scores of EMBI Global spread, US corporate high yield spread
(Merrill Lynch US High Yield index), implied volatility of US equities (VIX index), implied volatility of US Treasury 
bonds (Merrill Lynch MOVE index) and implied volatility of G10 exchange rates (JPMorgan GVXF7 index); in
percentage points. These components are shown separately in Graph A1. 
Sources: Bloomberg; national data. 
                                                  
3   Risk appetite is not of course directly measurable. Changes in price spreads in a specific market can equally 
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A second version is that it was the too-smooth and too-well-announced nature of the path of 
policy rate increases (eg the famous “measured pace” from 2004) that caused the problem. 
Being too predictable in increasing rates allowed banks and others to leverage positions 
more safely than if sharper movements in rates – more closely corresponding to the irregular 
movements in macroeconomic prospects – had caught market participants by surprise. 
According to this view, the too-clear intimation by a central bank of the future path of policy 
interest rates encourages excessive leverage in interest rate and other risk exposures. The 
counterargument of course is that announcing a central bank’s intentions in advance could 
help anchor expectations – so that changes in market rates “do the work of the central bank”. 
A third version of this thesis is that the actions of central banks over a long period had 
convinced markets that the central bank could prevent a collapse of financial asset prices. It 
had, some argue, given credence to the hope that better policies had reduced underlying 
macroeconomic volatility. This led banks and other investors, assuming that adverse tail risks 
had been eliminated by an activist central bank, to underprice risk.  
A final version is the asymmetric reaction argument. The central bank willingly countenanced 
quite extreme asset price booms but then cut rates whenever prices fell sharply. According to 
this line of argument, it should have paid more attention to asset price increases. It is true 
that changes in asset prices (and other financial information) contain information that can 
correct shortcomings in conventional macroeconomic models. Yet this is much more likely to 
be the case during sharp downturns than during upturns. A generalised fall in asset prices –
almost always sharper than the preceding rises – tightens budget constraints for a large 
number of debtors simultaneously. This forces spending cuts and leads banks to tighten 
credit supply quite quickly and in unison. And because the price volatility of financial assets 
rises in a falling market, market positions tend to be adjusted more abruptly than in a rising 
market. Declines in asset prices therefore have a stronger effect on the economy than do 
increases in asset prices. (This asymmetry of the effects of asset price changes may, some 
argue, itself justify pre-emptive action against asset prices increases.)
4  
The arguments against raising interest rates by more than warranted by inflation forecasts to 
curb local asset price increases are well known:  
•  If monetary policy tightening is less effective in curbing asset prices than it is in 
curbing aggregate demand, then there is a risk that instrument misassignment could 
lead to large output losses but only limited moderation of asset prices. 
•  In countries with a short record of monetary stability, an interest rate policy that is 
inconsistent with the desired path of the targeted inflation rate could undermine 
central bank credibility and unsettle inflationary expectations. With so much talk in 
the past year of both deflation and inflation, this aspect is not to be neglected. 
•  The considerations of domestic asset prices on the one hand and of the exchange 
rate on the other can indicate opposite movements in policy rates. Countering an 
asset price boom by raising short-term interest rates can, for instance, lead to 
currency appreciation, induce foreign purchases of short-term debt securities and in 
effect shorten the duration of external liabilities. 
Even so, there may be cases when preventing extreme asset price movements would be 
desirable simply because of the destabilising feedback effects that would be generated. 
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Michael Dooley rejects the argument that the monetary policy framework contributed to the 
crisis. Nor does Vittorio Corbo see IT-focused monetary policy as the major culprit. But 
Corbo nevertheless suggests how incorporating asset prices (and perhaps monetary and 
credit aggregates) into the monetary policy framework might help.  
Macroprudential  
The third school of thought is that not enough attention was paid to macroeconomic/financial 
system linkages – and that “macroprudential” policies are needed to address these issues. 
The concept “macroprudential” is elusive.
5 The focus is not on an individual institution (which 
is the microprudential perspective) but on the whole system. The macroeconomy, the nature 
of the linkages between banks, the liquidity of markets in which banks operate and the 
aggregate pricing of risk are all relevant dimensions for a macroprudential orientation of 
policy. The aim is to ensure that the financial system operates so that the effect of a shock is 
damped, not amplified. 
Market liquidity is central to this systemic perspective. Before the recent crisis, it was clear 
that banks and others took positions because they thought they could unwind them at will – 
on the (unwarranted) assumption that markets would always supply an unlimited amount of 
liquidity. “Liquidity” is of course a very nebulous concept. Michael Dooley argues in his paper 
that a central feature of the recent crisis was that the markets for many emerging market and 
other risk assets became illiquid because their value as collateral dropped sharply when the 
price volatility of these assets – which determines the “haircut” applied – rose. The key 
insight is that the value of collateral is endogenous in the system.  
Vittorio Corbo says that macroprudential regulation is the approach best suited to maintain 
financial stability. He argues that macroprudential tools are better for this purpose than the 
monetary policy rate because they can be directed at particular distortions in the financial 
system. But he is under no illusions about the very real difficulties in putting this idea into 
practice: coordinating macroprudential and monetary policy; strengthening the accountability 
of the central bank for its actions; and resisting fierce political resistance to any tightening of 
credit terms for lending for “good” purposes, such as housing for low-income families. 
                                                  
5   For a history of the uses of this term, which began to be used in BIS meetings in 1979, see Piet Clement “The 
term ‘macroprudential’: origins and evolution”. BIS Quarterly Review, March 2010. 
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The vertical dotted lines mark 23 September 1998 (the date of the bailout of Long Term Capital Management); 
11 September 2001; 2 December 2001 (the Enron bankruptcy); and 15 September 2008 (the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy). 
1  In percentage points.    
2  Merrill Lynch US High Yield index. 
Sources: Bloomberg; national data. 